Read the RAMOS VS LOUISIANA U.S.A. Supreme Court to see a Supreme Court struggling with an issue seemingly unaware there is mathematics and a mathematics formula that answers the specific questions they were asking about jury size, and jury vote accuracy. It is a tragic situation because of the damage caused from lack of awareness by lawyers, courts, and law schools of the Vote Accuracy equation or jury vote evaluation. Worse, the Supreme Court failed to apply the unanimity rule in Ramos v Louisiana requirements to itself.

A public usually votes to elect a president, and a parliament votes to create a new law or to allocate a budget, and a Supreme Court or a court jury votes to decide a court case. For thousands of years, these votes have been done without measuring mathematically the accuracy of the vote. It is like buying a gun, to use against criminals, yet the gun has no accuracy, and every time the policeman fired at a violent attacker, an innocent person next to the criminal got killed because the gun accuracy was low. A vote with low accuracy does not kill or injure only one person, it injures millions of innocent humans at the same time. So, the question became: If there is a mathematical equation that measures precisely the accuracy of the vote, why are governments not using it? Why are mathematicians not yelling and asking governments to use it? 

The U.S. Supreme Court case of EVANGELISTO RAMOS Versus Louisiana Filed on October 7, 2019, and decided on April 20, 2020: The U.S. Supreme Court decision states:

"RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA,

FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18 5924. Argued October 7, 2019 , Decided April 20, 2020

In 48 States and federal court, a single juror’s vote to acquit is enough to

prevent a conviction. But two States, Louisiana and Oregon, have long

punished people based on 10 to 2 verdicts. In this case, petitioner

Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of a serious crime in a Louisiana

court by a 10 to 2 jury verdict. Instead of the mistrial he would have

received almost anywhere else, Ramos was sentenced to life without

parole. He contests his conviction by a nonunanimous jury as an un-

constitutional denial of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Held: The judgment is reversed."

End of the court decision.

The decision was made by a U.S. Supreme Court jury composed of 9 Supreme Court judges, with 6 judges voting 'yes' and 3 judges voting 'no'.

Even though the Supreme Court said unanimity is required in a jury vote, it failed to enforce this logic on itself. The USA Supreme Court failed to say that this decision applies to the Supreme Court as well.

These supreme court judges are supposedly some of the most learned and thoughtful individuals, and their decisions affects some 400 hundred million persons. And the rest of the world listens to what they say. So, the rest of the world is also unaware of the Vote Accuracy equation.

In the case arguments, we hear judges struggling with the issue of vote accuracy, completely unaware that there is a Vote Accuracy formula in existence. Here are parts of the Supreme Court transcript:

"Justice Kavanaugh: What about the size of the jury, if we were to accept your argument here, how or could we draw a distinction between this case and the precedence on size of a jury?

MR. FISHER: Well, Justice Kavanaugh, I think Williams itself tells you how you would do that. It says that the question under the Sixth Amendment is whether the feature at issue is an indispensable feature or, as the Court also put it, an essential feature of the right to jury trial as we practice it in this country. And what the Court concluded in Williams after looking at historical sources was they were mixed. And probably the better reading of those sources were the 12-person rule was just a historical accident...

Justice Ginsburg: Mr. Fisher, Williams, I think, is a problem for you. If only six minds need to agree to convict of a criminal offense, why shouldn't ten be enough?

MR. FISHER: Justice Ginsburg, the key principle is not how many. It's the degree of agreement. And so … my core proposition to you today is that a 10-2 verdict is less guaranteed to be accurate and less guaranteed to be consonant with the purposes of jury trial than a 6 (to) 0 verdict.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I know. But, I mean, I guess I'm not sure that's self-apparent. I mean, I don't know whether you play it out in game theory or something, but if you asked the defendant, what do you want? Do you want six, and they have to agree across the board, or do you want 12, and you have got to convince --that's not immediately apparent to me … which I would take.

MR. FISHER: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, can I give you a legal answer and a practical answer?

So as a legal answer, the … unanimity required even of a six-person verdict is more consistent with, and, in fact, is the only consistent outcome  with the purposes of the jury trial clause because the core purposes are effective deliberation towards an accurate decision"

In the final court ruling requiring unanimity, Justice Alito dissenting spoke of others who are not supporters of unanimity: He said "Some years ago the British Parliament enacted a law allowing non-unanimous verdicts ... The Constitution of Puerto Rico permits non unanimous verdicts ... Non unanimous verdicts were once advocated by the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association. "

Again, instead of providing a purely mathematical rationale for these arguments, the Supreme Court judges, the lawyers in the case and internationally, no one seems to know or seems to care to know that there is a mathematical formula that can answer these questions precisely.

Same for a congress or parliament that creates laws that do not measure accuracy and error of a vote, where that law is later used in a court. Should that law not meet the requirements or essence of this Supreme Court decision? How about a presidential election? Or election of a congressman? Are they not important decisions that effect 400 million Ramos at the same time?

On this website, go to the Vote Result calculator and enter some numbers to measure a U.S.A. Supreme Court vote accuracy, such as a vote that is 6 'yes' to 3 'no', or 5 to 4 or 9 to 0, and read all the related mathematics. You can learn so much about voting mathematics.

At some point, it becomes legitimate to ask "Are these people intentionally or unintentionally ignoring this formula?" Listen to this  audiobook that explains the Jury Vote accuracy equation to a general public: https://youtu.be/G-1YkGHLPBc

United Kingdom U.K. jury system:

"On a panel of 12 or 11 jurors, 10 must agree. On a panel of 10 jurors, 9 must agree. If for any reason there are 9 jurors or fewer, the verdict must always be unanimous." (https://www.law.ac.uk/resources/blog/everything-you-need-to-know-about-jury-service/#:~:text=On%20a%20panel%20of%2012%20or%2011%20jurors%2C,they%20must%20start%20over%20with%20a%20new%20jury.  May 13, 2024 4:39AM UTC)

What this tells us is that the U.K. and the U.S.A. system that relies on it, know little about voting mathematics. They have mathematics to design a Hubble Telescope and to design rockets and spaceships, but no mathematics for voting.

For law and Decision Making:

A jury system is superior to a single judge or person

Based on statistics principles that the greater the random sample size is, the more confidence and accuracy there is in the final computations, we can conclude that a jury is better or far better than a single individual for a judgement.

The jury may be composed of individuals, or experts in their field, such as judges, or any other specialty, as determined optimum by mathematical statistical principles.

Therefore: 1. As n, the sample size increase, so does Confidence Level, which is a necessary but insufficient condition. 2. As vote success proportion increases, so does accuracy accordingly to the Vote Accuracy Equation. 3. As number of answer-choices increase in a vote, so does accuracy accordingly to the Vote Accuracy Equation. With these three conditions, along with proper statistical sampling, we will have necessary and sufficient conditions for accurate judgement, cost aside.

Conclusion: A Jury system is better or far better than an individual judge or person if we desire the best judgement ( the best accuracy). But the jury should have a sufficient number of voters and sufficient success percent ("yes" voters proportion) according to the Vote Accuracy formula.

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -              

                            EVANGELISTO RAMOS,     )

                                     Petitioner,   )

                                   v. ) No. 18-5924

                            LOUISIANA,             )

                                     Respondent.   )

-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -             

Pages: 1 through 69

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: October 7, 2019

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION  

Official Reporters

1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 206

Washington, D.C.  20005

(202) 628-4888 www.hrccourtreporters.com 1      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

2                                 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -             

3                                 EVANGELISTO RAMOS,  )

4                                 Petitioner,    )

5                                 v.   ) No. 18-5924

6                                 LOUISIANA, )

7                                 Respondent.    )

8                                 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -             

9                                  

10                               Washington, D.C.

11                               Monday, October 7, 2019

         12

13   The above-entitled matter came on for  

14   oral argument before the Supreme Court of the

15   United States at 1:00 p.m.

         16

17             APPEARANCES:

18             JEFFERY L. FISHER, Stanford, California;

19             on behalf of the Petitioner.

20             ELIZABETH MURRILL, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge,

21             Louisiana; on behalf of the Respondent.

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C O N T E N T S

ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

JEFFREY L. FISHER, ESQ.

On behalf of the Petitioner

ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

ELIZABETH MURRILL, ESQ.

On behalf of the Respondent

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF:

JEFFREY L. FISHER, ESQ.

On behalf of the Petitioner

PAGE:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(1:00 p.m.) CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear

argument next in Case 18-5924, Ramos versus

Louisiana.

Mr. Fisher.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY L. FISHER ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MR. FISHER: Mr. Chief Justice, and

may it please the Court:

Last term in Timbs against Indiana,

this Court reaffirmed the well-settled rule that

13   incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights  

14   apply the same way to the states as they apply

15   to the federal government.

16   Taking that rule as the given, the  

17   state does not defend Justice Powell's pivotal  

18   vote in the Apodaca case. And, indeed, that  

19   reasoning flouted precedent at the time and has  

20   since been relegated to nothing more than an

21   isolated relic of an abandoned doctrine.

22   The state's only defense in -- in   

23   support of the judgment below is that the Sixth  

24   Amendment does not require unanimity at all; that is, not in state courts or in federal

courts.

This Court should reject that

3                         argument. As the Court has said many times over   

4                         many decades, the Sixth Amendment requires a  

5                         unanimous verdict to convict. In particular,   

6                         what the Court has said is that the Sixth

7                         Amendment right to trial by jury carries with it

8                         the essentials of the common law.

9                         And the common law authorities are  

10                       uniform, explicit, and absolute. Unanimity is

11                       an absolute requirement to trial by jury. And  

12                       the reasons that the common law commentators  

13                       gave for that rule are the -- are -- resonate    

14                       just as powerfully now as they did then. In a   

15                       nutshell, we are not prepared to take away

16                       someone's liberty unless a cross-section of the

17                       community uniformly agrees that criminal

18                       punishment is appropriate.

19                       Now, I don't think the state disputes  

20                       that historical account that I just gave you or  

21                       even that unanimity is central to the proper  

22                       functioning of the jury trial right. Instead,

23                       what the state says are two primary things:

24                       First, that the drafting history of

25                       the Sixth Amendment suggests that the framers

meant to dispense with that historical rule,

2                       and, second, that that historical requirement of

3                       unanimity is no more important than the

4                       12-person rule, which this Court said is not

5                       part of the Sixth Amendment, in Williams.  

6                       So let me turn to those two arguments.

7                       Let me start with the drafting history. And we   

8                       think for three reasons the state has over-read

9                       the drafting history.

10                     First, as the Court itself said in  

11                     cases dealing with provisions like the Second  

12                     Amendment and the Double Jeopardy Clause, we do  

13                     not read into a deletion of language any meaning  

14                     when there's no contemporary evidence that it  

15                     was designed to change the meaning of the

16                     provision.

17                     And that's all the more true here  

18                     because of the contextual backdrop. The state  

19                     talks about the fact that many states at the  

20                     time had trial by jury provisions in their own

21                     constitutions and correctly notes that some of  

22                     those provisions explicitly required unanimity

23                     but some of them didn't.

24                     And the rule was the same across all of those states, so the thing that the framers

would have taken from the context at the time

2                       would have been that it doesn't matter whether

3                       you have unanimity in the provision; it requires

4                       it either way.

5                       CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but  

6                       still that -- 

7                       MR. FISHER: And I think --

8                       CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I mean, to  

9                       give them -- to be fair, even if you see some   

10                     have unanimity, some don't, and you've got a  

11                     draft that says unanimity, I don't understand  

12                     why you would take it out and just then be able

13                     to argue later, well, it doesn't matter whether  

14                     it was in or not. It's in there in the draft;  

15                     why would they take it out?

16                     MR. FISHER: Well, the best historical  

17                     evidence, Mr. Chief Justice, is that it was -- 

18                     it got latched onto a debate about the vicinage  

19                     requirement. And so what James Madison did is  

20                     take away all of the elaboration of the -- of  

21                     the right to trial by jury.

22                     And so I think actually the best  

23                     example also to respond is -- is --     is the

24                     Pennsylvania Constitution, which at the time of

25                     the founding required unanimity explicitly. And  

then Justice Wilson actually amended the --

2                         rewrote the constitution in -- in Pennsylvania  

3                         to take it out. And, remember, Justice Wilson,  

4                         as we note at length in our brief, was one of  

5                         the leading expositors of the common law notion

6                         of trial by jury and the Sixth Amendment

7                         requiring unanimity.

8                         And I think that was the last thing I  

9                         wanted to say about the drafting history, is  

10                       that one would think that if the framers had  

11                       dispensed with 400 years of uniform practice,

12                       that somebody would have said something about  

13                       it. But what you have is the reverse. You have  

14                       Justice Wilson, right after the Constitution's  

15                       founding, talking at great length about how

16                       unanimity is "indispensable."

17                       You have Justice Story in his  

18                       Commentaries using exactly the same word,  

19                       "indispensable." And you have any number of   

20                       other criminal law treatises at the time, all of  

21                       which are gathered in our brief and at greater  

22                       length in the ACLU brief that canvasses the

23                       history, all reinforcing this notion.

24                       JUSTICE ALITO: You are asking us to overrule Apodaca, so we do have to think about

             stare decisis. And last term, the majority was   

2         lectured pretty sternly in a couple of dissents

3         about the importance of stare decisis and about

4         the impropriety of overruling established rules.

5         I'm thinking about the dissent in Franchise Tax  

6         Board and the dissent in Knick versus Township

7         of Scott.

8         And a very important consideration in  

9         considering stare decisis is reliance. So it   

10   would be helpful to me if you could compare the  

11   reliance that's at issue here. Louisiana and

12   Oregon have tried thousands of cases, in

13   reliance on Apodaca. The Court said: This was  

14   okay. We've never -- we've never suggested that  

15   it wasn't. We've denied cert in lots of cases.  

16   So can you compare the reliance here  

17   with the reliance in Franchise Tax Board and in

18   Knick?

19   MR. FISHER: Well, I think Justice  

20   Alito, I'd like to make both a legal comparison

21   and a factual comparison.

22   So starting with the law, I think it's  

23   important to note that the state here is -- is   

24   claiming to rely on Apodaca, but they are not

25   defending the rule of Apodaca, which is that the

   Fourteenth Amendment doesn't require states to

2   have unanimous verdicts. Instead, they're

3   asking the Court to adopt a new rule of Sixth

4   Amendment law that the Court has never adopted.

5   And I know the Court last term, as you  

6   -- as you note, in part of those disagreements,  

7   some justices were saying, well, it's okay to  

8   come up and rehabilitate an old rule; that

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shouldn't forgo stare decisis value.

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, but that's --

MR. FISHER: But here the state is

asking for a brand-new rule.

JUSTICE ALITO: I -- I don't want to  

interrupt. That's a fair point, but we're not

15   tied in deciding this case to the position  

16   that's taken by the state. We have a decision   

17   of this Court, Apodaca, and we could -- we could  

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affirm it on -- on a different ground from the  one that the -- the exact one the state has --  has advanced.

But I want you to complete what you

were saying.

MR. FISHER: Yeah, so let me give you

         24    three reasons why, even if you take that as a -- as a given, stare decisis shouldn't carry the

1                         day. And then I'll turn to the facts.

2                         But still sticking with the law, three

3                         things: One is remember Justice Powell's vote  

4                         was an isolated vote where there was no majority  

5                         for the Court, and it was -- indeed, his vote  

6                         was rejected by the other --

7                         JUSTICE KAGAN: So could I ask you -- 

8                         MR. FISHER: -- eight justices on the

9                         Court.  

10                       JUSTICE KAGAN: This is so unfair, Mr.

11                       Fisher, but could I ask you to take that out of  

12                       your analysis and just pretend for the remainder

13                       of your analysis, I -- I think that's an  

14                       important consideration, which I'm not quite  

15                       sure how to think about, but if you assume that

16                       this was, you know, just any old 5-4 decision.

17                       MR. FISHER: So I would then move to   

18                       my second point, which would be that the -- the   

19                       -- that Fourteenth Amendment rule, even if it  

20                       had been adopted by a majority, is a derelict in

21                       the law. It is isolated -- it is really an   

22                       abandoned relic of past jurisprudence. And you  

23                       don't have to look further than last term in  

24                       Timbs. You can look at the McDonald opinion and 25    you can look at any number of other --

1                       JUSTICE KAGAN: Well --

2                       MR. FISHER: -- opinions from this

3                       Court that say the same standards have to apply

4                       to the states as the federal government.

5                       JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean, it would be an  

6                       outlier. It would be something that says, look,  

7                       we just -- we have an exception here. We -- we     

8                       are going to treat this amendment differently.

9                       But you know we tolerate a pretty  

10                     significant degree of diversity in state

11                     criminal procedure, and this could just be one  

12                     of those sorts of rules, where -- where we say   

13                     you -- you know, there are occasional times   

14                     where we think that the state gets to decide  

15                     something on its own. And so, yeah, it's

16                     anomaly. Usually, we do look in stare decisis  

17                     reasoning for anomalies, but this is not the  

18                     kind of anomaly that should concern us overmuch  

19                     because, in general, criminal procedure law is

20                     loaded with anomalies.

21                     MR. FISHER: Well, Justice Kagan, I  

22                     think -- let me respond one thing I hope isn't   

23                     fighting the premise, but what I would say is if  

24                     the -- if you look at the Court's incorporation  

jurisprudence, that is the one place the Court

has not accepted anomalies and where the Court

2                         has said that stare decisis is at a very low ebb

3                         when it comes to states following the

4                         fundamental rules of the road of the Bill of  

5                         Rights. So I think on that level, it is a  

6                         different kind of a situation than the ordinary

7                         stare decisis case.

8                         JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did Timbs recognize

9                         that exception?  

10                       MR. FISHER: Pardon me?

11                       JUSTICE GINSBURG: Timbs, in saying  

12                       the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the  

13                       states, recognize Apodaca as an exception?

14                       Recognized the Sixth Amendment was the one

15                       exception to complete incorporation?

16                       MR. FISHER: That's right, Justice  

17                       Ginsburg. And I think my argument today is that   

18                       even though that's been an exception for several

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years, it shouldn't go forward.

It doesn't have any footing in the

law. There's no --

JUSTICE KAGAN: What else have you

got?

MR. FISHER: -- Fourteenth Amendment

footing. So let me turn to the -- to I think  

back to Justice Alito's question, because I

2                         think you were asking about convictions.

3                         And I think this is another area where  

4                         stare decisis actually has less to say than  

5                         normal. And that's because the Court already  

6                         has a developed set of doctrines, like the

7                         Teague jurisprudence and the Griffith

8                         jurisprudence that are themselves designed to  

9                         give states reliance interest in their past and

10                       past precedent from this Court.

11                       So unlike the ordinary case, Franchise  

12                       Tax Board and any number of other doctrines, you  

13                       have this whole separate set of doctrines that  

14                       the state can invoke to support its reliance

15                       interest -- 

16                       JUSTICE ALITO: Well, we don't know -- 

17                       MR. FISHER: -- in those past

18                       convictions.

19                       JUSTICE ALITO: -- how a decision in  

20                       your favor in this case would play out in

21                       collateral review, either in federal court or in

22                       state court.

23                       But do you think -- I mean, I -- I can      

24                       well envision seeing you up here in a term or two arguing this is a water -- the rule that you  

are trying to persuade us to accept today is a

2                       watershed rule of criminal procedure.

3                       Do you think that's a -- a frivolous  

4                       argument?

5                       MR. FISHER: I don't think it's

6                       frivolous, Justice Alito. I think the best   

7                       thing the state will have to say for itself in  

8                       that respect is that Duncan itself, when the  

9                       Court incorporated the right to jury trial,  

10                     Duncan itself was not held to be retroactive in  

11                     the DeStefano opinion, and in Schiro against

12                     Summerlin the Court reaffirmed that precedent.

13                     But, Justice Alito, the core point  

14                     that I'm making to you today is, in deciding  

15                     whether to overrule a past case, absolutely

16                     reliance interests are at stake.

17                     But there are separate doctrines to  

18                     protect those reliance interests, so that I

19                     don't think you should give them undue weight in  

20                     this situation. And I don't think the Court has   

21                     given those kinds of things undue weight in the  

22                     past. And I would direct the Court back to its   

23                     McDonald decision where it catalogued all the

24                     times over the years in the Court's incorporation jurisprudence that it has

1                         overruled past cases.

2                         And I don't think there is any other

3                         area of law in the Court's jurisprudence where  

4                         stare decisis over the years has held less value

5                         than --

6                         JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What about -- 

7                         MR. FISHER: -- incorporation.

8                         JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Sorry.

9                         MR. FISHER: No, go ahead.

10                       JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What about the  

11                       size of the jury, if we were to accept your

12                       argument here, how or could we draw a

13                       distinction between this case and the precedence

14                       on size of a jury?

15                       MR. FISHER: Well, Justice Kavanaugh,  

16                       I think Williams itself tells you how you would  

17                       do that. It says that the question under the   

18                       Sixth Amendment is whether the feature at issue  

19                       is an indispensable feature or, as the Court  

20                       also put it, an essential feature of the right

21                       to jury trial as we practice it in this country.

22                       And what the Court concluded in

23                       Williams after looking at historical sources was

24                       they were mixed. And probably the better reading of those sources were the 12-person rule

1                         was just a historical accident.

2                         And so that is a holding of this Court

3                         that puts it on the other side of the ledger  

4                         from the uniform common law authorities when it  

5                         comes to unanimity and that holding, moreover,  

6                         Justice Kavanaugh, would be entitled to a stare

7                         decisis effect.

8                         JUSTICE KAGAN: Do you think --

9                         JUSTICE GORSUCH: What -- what --   

10                       JUSTICE KAGAN: -- we would have to --

11                       JUSTICE GORSUCH: Sorry.

12                       JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Fisher,

13                       Williams, I think, is a problem for you. If   

14                       only six minds need to agree to convict of a

15                       criminal offense, why shouldn't ten be enough?

16                       MR. FISHER: Justice Ginsburg, the key  

17                       principle is not how many. It's the degree of   

18                       agreement. And so my -- my core proposition to  

19                       you today is that a 10-2 verdict is less

20                       guaranteed to be accurate and less guaranteed to  

21                       be consonant with the purposes of jury trial

22                       than a 6-0 verdict. And I think --     

23                       CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And that's --   

24                       MR. FISHER: -- maybe it would help -- CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You prefaced

1                         that by saying that's a key part of the

2                         distinction you are trying to draw?

3                         MR. FISHER: Well, I -- maybe it is  

4                         the very distinction.  

5                         CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I know.  

6                         But, I mean, I guess I'm not sure that's

7                         self-apparent. I mean, I don't know whether you   

8                         play it out in game theory or something, but if  

9                         you asked the defendant, what do you want? Do   

10                       you want six, and they have to agree across the  

11                       board, or do you want 12, and you have got to  

12                       convince -- that's not immediately apparent to  

13                       me which -- which I would take.  

14                       MR. FISHER: Well, Mr. Chief Justice,  

15                       can I give you a legal answer and a practical

16                       answer?

17                       So as a legal answer, the -- the  

18                       unanimity required even of a six-person verdict  

19                       is more consistent with -- and, in fact, is the  

20                       only consistent outcome -- with the purposes of   

21                       the jury trial clause because the core purposes  

22                       are effective deliberation towards an accurate

23                       decision and a cross-section of the community.

24                       Now, remember what happens in

Louisiana and in Oregon is that a cross-section

of the community, somewhat by design, can be

2                         left out of and canceled out of those

3                         deliberations. And that's very different than a

4                         6/0 verdict when it comes to the way things

5                         happen in the jury room and the public

6                         confidence in that verdict.

7                         And I'll also give you a practical  

8                         answer to your question. When Louisiana was  

9                         considering changing its law, and, indeed, did

10                       change its law, which I would say

11                       parenthetically is also something that I think  

12                       should be taken into account when it comes to  

13                       stare decisis, that Louisiana has even changed  

14                       its law, but during those deliberations there  

15                       was a prosecutor who testified before the

16                       legislature and said that he used to sometimes  

17                       charge felonies instead of misdemeanors because

18                       it was easier to get a 10-2 verdict than it was

19                       to get a 6-0 verdict.

20                       JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Fisher, let's

21                       say I am not entirely persuaded by your

22                       functionalist arguments about the distinction  

23                       between unanimity and numbers between this case

24                       and Williams.

Have you got anything else besides

1                         these functionalist arguments about the real

2                         great importance about unanimity and the

3                         relative lack of importance about numbers?

4                         MR. FISHER: I think what I would say  

5                         to you, Justice Gorsuch, is the text of the  

6                         Sixth Amendment understood through its purpose  

7                         distinguishes this case from Williams. And so

8                         let me explain what I mean by that.

9                         The text of the Sixth Amendment says  

10                       the defendant has a right to trial by jury. And   

11                       so the key is what does that phrase mean? And   

12                       from history we know that that phrase meant that

13                       not just that the defendant got a jury, but that

14                       the trial by jury included the way the jury

15                       reached its decision.

16                       In fact, if we -- if we have a jury   

17                       who hangs or can't reach a verdict, there's a

18                       mistrial. So we don't even have trial by jury.  

19                       So that's inherent in the term.

20                       I think what the Court said in

21                       Williams is that of course there are going to be  

22                       some features of the common law. Imagine, for  

23                       example, that the justice -- that the jurors all   

24                       had to wear a particular color jacket to -- to  courtroom. There is going to be certain

incidental features of the right to jury trial

2                         that don't necessarily have to be read along

3                         with the Sixth Amendment.

4                         There would be certain things that  

5                         happened to occur at common law that wouldn't

6                         necessarily be brought forward today.

7                         Now, I think maybe what you're -- 

8                         you're driving at to some degree is I think  

9                         there is an argument and there was a powerful  

10                       argument made in Williams that 12 -- that the   

11                       12-person requirement shouldn't be thought of  

12                       that way. There were some people who thought  

13                       the 12-person requirement was also a very

14                       important feature.

15                       But, of course, there were others who  

16                       didn't. Lord Coke, which the Court quoted, and  

17                       many other commentators thought, well, no, 12

18                       people is just a fanciful number. It's

19                       inherently arbitrary. It doesn't really mean   

20                       anything. And so all we're getting at in this   

21                       case I think are what's the core meaning of the

22                       phrase -- phrase trial by jury.  

23                       JUSTICE ALITO: If the --

24                       JUSTICE KAGAN: Do you think, Mr.

Fisher, that we would also have to overrule

Ludwig versus Massachusetts if we overruled

2                         Apodaca?

3                         If I understand it right, that was  

4                         another case in which Justice Powell's unusual  

5                         approach to incorporation ended up being the  

6                         deciding vote in the case. It was about a  

7                         two-tiered jury system.

8                         MR. FISHER: That's right, Justice  

9                         Kagan. I think that all my position here today   

10                       would tell you, if you were to revisit that, is  

11                       that -- is that Justice Powell's vote in that   

12                       case, just like in this case, doesn't set up a  

13                       rule of law the Court should adhere to. But you  

14                       would still have a separate Sixth Amendment  

15                       question in Ludwig which the Court -- I'm sorry   

16                       -- which the Court divided on and you'd -- you  

17                       would consider that case on its own terms.

18                       And to be perfectly candid with you, I  

19                       don't even know what the common law would say  

20                       about the two-tiered jury system. That was not  

21                       something the Court considered in that case and

22                       it would be a whole different set of arguments.

23                       JUSTICE KAGAN: You --

24                       JUSTICE GORSUCH: Do you --

JUSTICE KAGAN: You -- you started off  

and then I told you to stop, but I thought I'd give you an opportunity to do it again.

3                         I mean, what are we to make of this  

4                         4-1-4 reasoning of Apodaca and -- and -- and    

5                         what do you think the rule should be about stare

6                         decisis going forward? Do you need a majority?  

7                         Do you just need a controlling rule? What's --

8                         what's the right way to think about that?

9                         MR. FISHER: Well, I can tell you what  

10                       I think and I can tell you what the Court has  

11                       done. I think that there are times where a   

12                       single vote could be accorded stare decisis  

13                       effect, particularly if it's comfortably a

14                       narrower ground within the Marks rule.

15                       But then you have other cases more  

16                       like this where Marks doesn't so easily fit onto  

17                       that system. And I think that the most recent   

18                       time the Court dealt with a situation like that  

19                       was the Hughes case a couple terms ago, where  

20                       you had a 4-1-4 vote in the prior case and what  

21                       the Court said is we're going to consider this

22                       issue fresh.

23                       The Court did the same thing in

24                       Seminole Tribe. And -- and Seminole Tribe is a  good example of a case that drew deep divisions

within the Court as to what the substantive meaning of the Eleventh Amendment was.  But  

3         Justice Souter in his dissent said I do not

4         begrudge the majority for considering this issue

5         fresh, because there was no majority of the  

6         Court that had proper -- that had previously  

7         spoken to it and our votes were all over the

8         map.

9         JUSTICE ALITO: Well, what about a  

10   party that has to make decisions about how it's  

11   going to order its affairs in the wake of a  

12   decision that it wins but does it in a 4-1-4  

13   decision? What are they -- what is that party   

14   supposed to do? Say, well, all right, we won   

15   this case, but we really can't rely on it

16   because we don't know what -- because it has no   

17   stare decisis effect, and then what happens as

18   the years go by and nothing happens, the Court

19   doesn't come back to that question?

20   MR. FISHER: Well, Justice Alito, I  

21   think that at least in the ordinary case, the -- 

22   the -- the party would have every -- every right       

23   to rely on this Court's decision, subject to the  

24   ordinary principles of stare decisis that we're deciding.

I think the one thing that makes this

case unusual is you would think that if the

3                         party did rely on that prior case they'd at  

4                         least come up and defend it instead of ask the

5                         Court for a different rule.

6                         And I think that just tells you

7                         something about how -- how discredited the fifth   

8                         vote in this -- in this case is, which I think   

9                         makes it almost a universe of one. I can't  

10                       think of -- I --    I've looked and I haven't found  

11                       any other case where somebody has gone to -- 

12                       come up to this Court and said: I'm not even   

13                       going to make an argument based on the provision

14                       of the Constitution on which the previous

15                       decision rests. That -- 

16                       JUSTICE ALITO: Can I come back to the

17                       -- the math question that was alluded to  

18                       earlier? I am not myself, I must confess,

19                       capable of doing this math, but somebody could.

20                       So if you hypothesize a jury pool with  

21                       a certain percentage of jurors who were inclined

22                       to acquit, and you ask is there a greater

23                       likelihood of acquittal with a 6-0 verdict than  

24                       a 10-2 verdict or an 11-1 verdict or if the state decides to have a jury that's bigger than

1         12, a 15-1 -- a 15-person injury, 14-1; 19-1,  

2         when we get to the point where the chance of

3         acquittal is -- is in favor of the non-unanimous  

4         rule, would that be unconstitutional?

5         MR. FISHER: My rule is that any time  

6         the state deviates from unanimity, it is

7         unconstitutional, so even if a state were to go  

8         beyond the number of 12. And I think the reason   

9         why is because it's a different phenomenon when

10   somebody disagrees in the jury room.

11   And I don't mean to be presumptuous,  

12   but I've heard some justices of this Court  

13   remark there's a difference between a 9-0

14   opinion and an 8-1 opinion. When somebody puts   

15   reasonable, good-faith views on the table and  

16   requires an answer from the others, it sharpens

17   ones thinking, it leads to better results

         18 

         19 

         20 

         21 

         22 

         23 

sometimes --

JUSTICE ALITO: I mean, you really --  MR. FISHER: -- and at least in a jury

room, that would be case.

JUSTICE ALITO: You really want to

argue that? So if a -- if a petit jury had to

         24    be as big as a grand jury and you were representing a criminal defendant, you would

            rather -- you would say we want --                      6-0 is better

2                         for us than 21 to 1?

3                         MR. FISHER: Justice Alito, perhaps  

4                         there'd be a number where that argument would  

5                         start to be difficult, and I think that -- that  

6                         what I would tell you is the history and  

7                         tradition of this country makes it highly

8                         unlikely that we're ever going to see a system

9                         like that.

10                       What we have uniformly, almost,

11                       throughout the states is a ceiling of 12. And I  

12                       think -- you talked about a math problem. And I     

13                       think maybe it's also helpful to remind the  

14                       Court of the Court's term -- decision last term   

15                       in Flowers, where the Court talked about the

16                       math of preemptory challenges.

17                       And I think you have a similar math  

18                       problem here, which is if you have one or two  

19                       members of a minority on a jury, it could be a

20                       racial minority, it could be a political

21                       minority, it could be a religious minority, are

22                       we really prepared to say that those one or two

23                       votes can be utterly canceled out?

24                       JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do the racial origins of this rule have an impact on how we

1                         think about stare decisis in this case?

2                         MR. FISHER: I think they do, Justice

3                         Kavanaugh. I think -- 

4                         JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: How? How do --

5                         how should we factor those in?  

6                         MR. FISHER: I think in a couple ways.

7                         I think, when you talk about how reasonable the  

8                         reliance is from the state, I think it's perhaps  

9                         justifiable to look at the origins of the law

10                       that it's defending.

11                       But I also think more directly, if

12                       you're asking whether Justice Powell's

13                       Fourteenth Amendment reasoning should stand, he  

14                       didn't even consider this history. I'm not sure  

15                       it was put in front of the Court. And as the  

16                       Court has said many other times like in

17                       McDonald, like in Pena-Rodriguez, when we're  

18                       reading provisions of the Bill of Rights against  

19                       the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the  

20                       history and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment

21                       is a salient way to -- 

22                       JUSTICE ALITO: You really --

23                       MR. FISHER: -- think that.

24                       JUSTICE ALITO: -- want to make that argument? You made a big deal of it in your  

brief.

2                         I thought you'd -- I thought you would  

3                         abandon it here today. But if -- if another   

4                         state were to enact the same statute that

5                         Louisiana has tomorrow and did it for all of the  

6                         legitimate policy reasons that have led such  

7                         entities as the American Bar Association and the  

8                         American Law Institute and lots of reputable  

9                         scholars and the framers of the Constitution of  

10                       Puerto Rico and the people who made the rule in

11                       the United Kingdom, all of which allow

12                       non-unanimous juries, if they -- if that was  

13                       enacted for that reason, that might be  

14                       constitutional, but this statute is not

15                       constitutional and the Oregon statute is not  

16                       constitutional because of the -- the origin that  

17                       you a attribute to them?

18                       MR. FISHER: No, Justice -- Justice   

19                       Alito. Let me make sure that I am clear with  

20                       the Court.

21                       We think that purpose perhaps could

22                       inform the Court's decision-making, and

23                       particularly if you're looking at stare decisis,  

24                       it could inform whether to stick with an old

Fourteenth Amendment rule, but we don't think

1         it's essential to our Sixth Amendment argument.

2         And we think if a state had followed the old ALI

3         recommendation before the Sixth Amendment was  

4         incorporated in the states, that I'd be making  

5         all -- all the other same arguments I'm making  

6         here today.

7         But I think the thing I would leave  

8         you with, before I sit down for rebuttal, is  

9         that it is telling, Justice Alito, I think, that

10   no state has ever done that. The only two   

11   states that have ever deviated did -- did so   

12   under circumstances where the cross-section of

13   the community that the jury trial was designed  

14   to bring into the courtroom had changed. And  

15   part of the design was to leave a part of that

16   cross-section, perhaps, out of deliberations.

17   JUSTICE KAGAN: You -- you mentioned a   

18   couple of times earlier in your argument where

19   the Court has said that a decision is entitled  

20   to less stare decisis effect because the parties

21   have come into Court and tried to kind of

22   improve the reasoning, so the Court has said, of

23   the earlier decision.

24   And as I understood what you were saying, you were saying that this even goes

beyond that.

2                         MR. FISHER: Right.

3                         JUSTICE KAGAN: Could -- could you   

4                         explain why or is it the same as that or --

5                         because I've never liked that argument. So is  

6                         this just -- is -- is --    is your argument just

7                         the same thing?

8                         MR. FISHER: No. I think it's a step  

9                         further, Justice Kagan. I think even if you  

10                       believe that parties ought to be entitled,  

11                       especially when there's many years between an  

12                       old decision and a new one, to -- to make --   

13                       defend the old decision with the rhythms and the  

14                       precedents and the ideas that have intervened -- 

15                       so, for example, to take a case like Citizens  

16                       United, perhaps the government could have come

17                       in in that case and made other First Amendment  

18                       arguments in support of that statute in that

19                       case.

20                       I think we have here something

21                       entirely different, though. The state is not

22                       even making a Fourteenth Amendment argument.

23                       They're asking the Court to adopt a rule -- and   

24                       let me just be clear, the rule that they're asking the Court to adopt is the Sixth Amendment

does not require unanimous verdict. Five

2                         justices in Apodaca squarely rejected that

3                         argument. And the Court, itself, in 14th -- 14  

4                         other opinions have rejected that argument.

5                         JUSTICE GINSBURG: It was unsettled -- 

6                         MR. FISHER: So, Justice Kagan, I

7                         think this is different in kind.

8                         JUSTICE GINSBURG: It was unsettled  

9                         until Apodaca. Unanimity question was not  

10                       settled until Apodaca, right? Well, because  

11                       four -- four of the justices there thought  

12                       unanimity was not required; four thought it was.

13                       MR. FISHER: My --

14                       JUSTICE GINSBURG: So it was Apodaca,  

15                       the fifth vote being Powell's vote, that said --

16                       set the precedent for you to require a unanimity

17                       in federal trials.

18                       MR. FISHER: Let me say something  

19                       about before Apodaca and then after, Justice  

20                       Ginsburg.  Before Apodaca, the Court had

21                       squarely held in Andres in the 1940s that the

22                       Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict.

23                       And it had said it many other times, but I think

24                       in that case, it was integral to the holding.

And so what I understood the four-justice

plurality to be saying in Apodaca was doing what

2         Justice White had said in a footnote in Duncan

3         it could do, which is reconsider the old

4         precedents.

5         But even if I didn't have that, I  

6         would have the five votes in Apodaca, Justice  

7         Ginsburg, and the statements in cases like

8         Richard and Descamps later, where the Court has  

9         cited Justice Powell's opinion as the law and

10   said that it settles the Sixth Amendment

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question.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,

counsel.

Ms. Murrill.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF ELIZABETH MURRILL

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT MS. MURRILL: Mr. Chief Justice, and

may it please the Court:

We agree with Petitioner that this

case presents two issues: whether the Sixth

21   Amendment requires unanimity and, if so, whether

22   that requirement applies to the states.

23   The Court should decide this case on  

24   the first issue because nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Sixth Amendment

requires unanimous jury verdicts.

Nor has this Court ever held that the

3                         framers wholesale adopted the common law. In  

4                         fact, the Court has expressly rejected that view

5                         in Hurtado with regard to the Bill of Rights and

6                         in Williams. Those correct holdings, plus  

7                         historical evidence that the framers expressly  

8                         rejected unanimity and the Sixth Amendment, are

9                         fatal to Petitioner's request to add back words

10                       that the Senate rejected in 1789.

11                       The reliance interests here are  

12                       overwhelming. Because the Sixth Amendment is  

13                       not a code of criminal procedure, over two

14                       centuries of states -- two --    for two centuries,

15                       states have adapted their criminal justice  

16                       systems to their particular circumstances, and  

17                       Louisiana for the last 50 years has specifically  

18                       relied on this Court's express approval of the

19                       system that's challenged here today again.

20                       We have 32,000 people that are

21                       currently serving time for serious crimes. And  

22                       each of these convictions would be subject to  

23                       challenge if Apodaca is reversed. Overruling

24                       Apodaca strikes -- would strike at the  foundation of widespread state practices that

include indictment by information and juries of fewer than 12.

3                         The beauty of our system, is that  

4                         people can change the rules. So if they now   

5                         want to require unanimity, they can do so. They  

6                         can amend their state laws, as Louisiana  

7                         recently did, or they can amend the federal

8                         Constitution.

9                         The judgment in Apodaca should be

10                       affirmed. And I'm happy to take questions.

11                       JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are you asking the   

12                       Court to take up a question that five justices  

13                       answered in Apodaca? That is, that the Sixth -- 

14                       Apodaca, five -- there were five votes to say   

15                       that the Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity

16                       in federal trials.

17                       You are asking to -- us to reject a  

18                       rule that five justices adhered to.

19                       MS. MURRILL: Justice Ginsburg, we   

20                       don't think that Justice Powell's decision was  

21                       entirely clear with regard to the rule as it  

22                       would apply historically. We think the text is  

23                       very, very clear that unanimity was -- is -- is    

24                       not there and that it was rejected. So --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But --

MS. MURRILL: -- we're happy --

3         JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- there were -- 

4         there were four justices who said unanimity was  

5         required. And then there was Justice Powell,  

6         who said unanimity is required in federal  

7         trials. You are asking us to overturn that  

8         position, that unanimity is required in federal

9         trials?

10   MS. MURRILL:  Justice Ginsburg, we  

11   don't believe that that was central to his  

12   holding or to his position in his plurality  

13   opinion. And -- and our position would be that   

14   one justice's opinion that is not central to his  

15   -- his plurality opinion plus four dissenters

16   does not -- is not equal to a holding.  

17   JUSTICE GORSUCH: Then aren't we -- 

18   aren't we in -- having to address this fresh,   

19   just as you really seem to want us to do? I   

20   mean, that -- that --    that seems to me an

21   admission that we are in a proper place to -- to  

22   take this up afresh.

23   If precedent weighs for anything, what  

24   do we do with Andres? What do we do with those  

14 cases throughout Supreme Court history that

seem to treat unanimity as part of the Sixth Amendment?

3         And what do we do as well with Hughes  

4         and with Seminole Tribe and a lot of other cases  

5         where we have been facing similarly splintered

6         decisions and the Court has come back and

7         addressed the question fresh without considering

8         stare decisis in those cases?

9         Sometimes the -- the Court can't reach   

10   majority opinion. Sometimes it's just unable  

11   to. And why doesn't a state take that risk when  

12   it relies on a decision that is so splintered?

13   MS. MURRILL: Justice Gorsuch, I think  

14   that Louisiana reasonably relied on a decision  

15   of this Court that it -- that non-unanimous   

16   juries were constitutional. They also did that  

17   on the tail end of a decision by this Court in  

18   Williams that found that a six-man jury was also

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constitutional.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, we're not

dealing with a --

                         MS. MURRILL: And -- and I don't --  

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- a six-person

jury, so we can put that aside. We're -- we're   dealing with unanimity. And I -- I don't think  

you're arguing that the Court did anything

2                         improper in Hughes or did anything improper in

3                         Seminole Tribe by taking up the question afresh.

4                         And I'm just curious why it would be  

5                         different here and why the state shouldn't be  

6                         assigned some degree of risk, assuming risk, by  

7                         proceeding in this area on the reliance of one  

8                         -- one member of the Court's opinion that is

9                         rather, I think fair to say, idiosyncratic?

10                       MS. MURRILL: Well, for one thing, I  

11                       think that incorporation doctrine evolved over  

12                       time. So I'm not sure that the state was -- it     

13                       was -- it was reasonable to expect the state to  

14                       ignore an actual holding in a case and

15                       anticipate that that would change over time.

16                       So that's -- that's one response that  

17                       I have to that question.

18                       My second response is that I think you  

19                       can take it up afresh. But -- but I also --   

20                       this is a non-textual --

21                       JUSTICE GORSUCH: I appreciate -- I

22                       appreciate that. That's helpful.  

23                       MS. MURRILL: Yeah.

24                       JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, just on that,

General Murrill, so, I mean, you don't really

want us to take that up afresh, do you? I mean,  

2         aren't you -- I'm sort of confused because there  

3         is the sentence in your brief that says neither  

4         party is asking the Court to accord Justice  

5         Powell's solo opinion in Apodaca precedential

6         force.

7         Is that right, that you're not asking  

8         us to accord Justice Powell's solo opinion  

9         precedential force? Because if that's right,  

10   then -- I mean, are you basically just saying to   

11   me: Forget Justice Powell's opinion in Apodaca;

12   just decide what the Sixth Amendment requires?

13   MS. MURRILL: Justice Kagan, I -- I  

14   think that given the evolution of incorporation  

15   theory, we find ourselves in a position where it

16   is even more important to get the text right and

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to get the history right.

                        So if -- if --   if that means taking

that issue up afresh --

JUSTICE KAGAN: But, you see -- MS. MURRILL: -- then we should do

that.

JUSTICE KAGAN: -- I think I agree

with Justice Alito. You have some strong reliance interests here, but -- but your  

reliance interests are only relevant in the

2                       context of an argument from stare decisis.

3                       And I guess I would like to know then  

4                       how are your reliance interests relevant? What

5                       argument from stare decisis are you making?

6                       MS. MURRILL: Well, we think that the

7                       text and the history do not include a

8                       non-unanimous jury verdict. We think that  

9                       that's a constitutional -- that is a choice that  

10                     states can make.

11                     JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: That's not -- 

12                     MS. MURRILL: And so, you know, that's  

13                     -- we think that the -- the four Justices, plus   

14                     Justice Powell's decision, were a ruling that

15                     said that it was not unconstitutional to have

16                     non-unanimous jury verdicts and it was

17                     reasonable for us to rely on that.

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So we don't -- we don't entirely  

disavow stare decisis. I mean, we still believe we have enormous reliance interests.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You were relying

on Justice Powell's opinion in Apodaca. That's the only --

MS. MURRILL: We're also relying --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: For stare decisis

that must be what you're relying on, combined

2                         with the other four that said the states don't

3                         have to provide unanimous juries.

4                         MS. MURRILL: Well, I think, Justice   

5                         Kavanaugh, that we're also relying on this  

6                         Court's opinions in -- in Williams and in   

7                         Hurtado that said that the Court -- that has  

8                         never adopted the common law wholesale.

9                         I mean, that's --

10                       JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you -- you --   

11                       MS. MURRILL: -- that is I think

12                       critical to the analysis.

13                       JUSTICE GINSBURG: Just to be clear,  

14                       you are not urging the Apodaca. You want us to  

15                       go back and say what the Sixth Amendment

16                       requires, the -- the issue on which the Court   

17                       was divided, you want us to say unanimity is not

18                       required in federal trials and it's not required

19                       in state trials, and on that issue, what is your  

20                       view of the Seventh Amendment? Does the Seventh  

21                       Amendment require unanimity in civil trials?

22                       MS. MURRILL: Justice Ginsburg, I  

23                       think the Seventh Amendment is a different

24                       question. Its text is different. Its structure 25 --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But just -- just  

2                       the -- 

3                       MS. MURRILL: -- is different.

4                       JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- the answer to my

5                       question: Is unanimity required under the  

6                       Seventh Amendment in civil trials in federal

7                       court?

8                       MS. MURRILL: I don't believe that it  

9                       would be required in the Seventh Amendment but I

10                     don't think you need to determine that here

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today.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well --

MS. MURRILL: That's not the issue. JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, this Court has

held --

MS. MURRILL:  The issue is the Sixth Amendment.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- that it --

there's a -- there's a holding of the Supreme  

20   Court that's over 100 years old so holding. And  

21   so no reliance interests for anybody there?

22   MS. MURRILL: Justice Gorsuch, my  

23   answer is specifically related to the text and  

24   what the text would require. I'm not disputing

25   that there might be precedent that would apply

1                         --

2                         JUSTICE GORSUCH: Oh, okay.

3                         MS. MURRILL:  -- in the Seventh

4                         Amendment.  

5                         JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right.

6                         MS. MURRILL: I just --

7                         JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. So we

8                         don't count precedent in the Seventh Amendment  

9                         but we do in this area on Justice Powell's

10                       opinion.

11                       Let's say the Seventh Amendment does  

12                       require a jury trial. In what universe does it   

13                       make sense to imagine that the framers of the  

14                       Constitution would have insisted on a jury trial  

15                       for civil cases where property is at stake but  

16                       not in criminal cases where liberty is at stake,

17                       and lives?

18                       MS. MURRILL: I -- I believe that the   

19                       structure and the history of both reach --

20                       ultimately on the textual answer reach the same

21                       result. I -- I --    I don't think that they

22                       would.

23                       JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. You

24                       disagree with the Supreme Court's analysis on the Seventh Amendment. I understand that.

But spot for me a moment that the

2         Supreme Court might have gotten the Seventh

3         Amendment right. Okay? It may be possible.  

4         All right? In -- in what universe would the  

5         rule be different for criminal cases?

6         MS. MURRILL: I -- I --  I don't think  

7         necessarily the rule would be different. I  

8         think that the -- that we have to look at what   

9         the text and the history demand, and that when  

10   we are talking about a non-textual right, I  

11   think that it is very, very important that the

12   Court get the history right.

13   And the history tells us that this -- 

14   that unanimity was rejected for a reason, that  

15   there were -- there was a very specific decision  

16   that was made to reject unanimity. It was  

17   proposed, it was rejected, it was debated, it  

18   was discussed, it was a known issue, because

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four states had --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How far --

MS. MURRILL: -- actually adopted

non-unanimity.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How far are

you willing to depart from unanimity? Would a 7-5 requirement be okay under your theory?

MS. MURRILL: Mr. Chief Justice, I

2         think this Court has established some of the

3         outer boundaries already in Williams and in  

4         Burch and in Will -- and in Apodaca. So nine,    

5         under Apodaca, 9-3 is okay.

6         I would -- I would also remind the   

7         Court that Louisiana in reliance on this Court's

8         decision in Apodaca and in Johnson went and at a

9         constitutional convention the year after this -- 

10   that case was decided, discussed it, expressly  

11   relied on it, and increased voting rules to

12   10-2.

13   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can we go back to  

14   reliance a moment? Putting aside that in Janus  

15   a couple of decisions from the Supreme Court put  

16   the unions on notice that things should -- that   

17   the constitutional theory was on shaky ground,  

18   and here you have a series of cases, much older,

19   telling you that the incorporation theory was on

20   shaky ground.

21   But you're talking about a parade of  

22   horribles if we rule against you. How about the  

23   parade of horribles if we rule in your favor?

24   How do we decide what's at the essence of the common law jury trial?

Would issues like having a fair

2                         cross-section of the community and the veneer be

3                         in question? We have a case that says that's   

4                         incorporated. Or what about what we said in  

5                         Sullivan, that the Sixth Amendment jury right  

6                         requires a jury verdict of guilty beyond a

7                         reasonable doubt?

8                         None of those terms are in the

9                         Constitution. None of those terms, as far as I  

10                       know, were part of the discussions at the

11                       convention. Are they going to be open to attack   

12                       now, too, if we rule in your favor? There's no   

13                       history, there's no anything, except our sense

14                       of what the essence of the common law right was.

15                       MS. MURRILL: And --

16                       JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Not our sense, but

17                       the history of what happened and why.

18                       MS. MURRILL: So I think, Justice  

19                       Sotomayor, that we have the text and what made

20                       the cut after the debates over what was missing.

21                       JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But the debates -- 

22                       MS. MURRILL: So --

23                       JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- we have a bunch  

24                       of people who were in favor of the cuts telling

25                       everybody else everybody understands that a

unanimous verdict is the standard.

2                         So we have part of the constitutional

3                         debate. Hamilton himself, who drafted it and

4                         took out the right to a unanimous jury,

5                         basically said during the -- the discussion it's  

6                         so self-evident, we don't need to include it.

7                         So you're looking at --

8                         MS. MURRILL: But --

9                         JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- history just in  

10                       terms of what was taken out, but without the

11                       context of the discussion.

12                       MS. MURRILL:  Not exclusively, Justice  

13                       Sotomayor. I think we also would agree that due  

14                       process and -- and equal protection play a role.  

15                       I mean, we -- we don't have requirements anymore  

16                       that it's only 12 white male freeholders.  

17                       JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Exactly.

18                       MS. MURRILL: So, you know, I think  

19                       that's an example of how we did not adopt the

20                       common law in all of its -- its -- its     

21                       historical terms. We actually -- Congress  

22                       adopted some of that language over time. It was  

23                       not embedded in the Constitution.

24                       So we -- we know that there was an  

historical debate. We know that states had

adopted a different rule, and -- and then some  

2         of them wrote this rule into their own state

3         constitution. So known debated problem.

4         There's a -- there --    Madison proposes  

5         an amendment, thinks he solved this problem, and

6         then it gets rejected by the Senate. So -- 

7         JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it -- but why   

8         was it rejected? I mean, one -- one account is  

9         it was totally unnecessary. Everybody  

10   understood a jury trial meant unanimous

11   agreement.

12   So we took it out because we didn't  

13   want to clutter up the Constitution with

14   unnecessary statements. The words "jury trial"

15   themselves mean unanimous verdict.

16   MS. MURRILL: Well, Justice Ginsburg,  

17   we did clutter it up with an impartial -- with   

18   the word "impartial." And we did clutter it up  

19   with a number of other terms.

20   And -- and I don't -- and I think that       

21   the history showing that states felt that it was

22   important to write it into some of their

23   constitutions indicates that there certainly was

24   at least a view that -- that it should be  

25   written in by some and not -- so I don't think  

it's a fair reading to -- to assume that that  

2                         was simply because we would all know that it  

3                         would be there, especially because they knew  

4                         that they were writing a document for the

5                         future.

6                         JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: For the sake of

7                         argument, assume that I think the Sixth

8                         Amendment requires a unanimous jury. Just for

9                         the sake of argument. What are your best  

10                       arguments, then, for why the right is not

11                       incorporated, and relatedly your best arguments  

12                       for not overruling Apodaca, which is read, the  

13                       -- the opposing counsel says, to have allowed

14                       the states to do that?

15                       MS. MURRILL: Justice Kavanaugh, they  

16                       are concededly not very good. I mean, I --  I  

17                       think that based on Timbs, that we recognize  

18                       that this Court, at least at this point in time,

19                       has taken a view of incorporation that says that

20                       there's no daylight. So if you find that  

21                       unanimity is required, I find myself in a far

22                       more difficult position --

23                       JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, yes --

24                       JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What about --

JUSTICE KAGAN: -- and no --

MS. MURRILL: -- to make that

2                       argument.

3                       JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes and no, General  

4                       Murrill, because you have this stare decisis,  

5                       except you're giving it away. And I don't know  

6                       what to make of that --

7                       MS. MURRILL: I --

8                       JUSTICE KAGAN: -- because I would  

9                       think what you would do is to say something  

10                     like: This is an outlier in our incorporation  

11                     doctrine. There's no question that it is. But     

12                     it has been an on outlier for 50 years. It has   

13                     been completely administrable. It has been  

14                     completely clear. States have had every right  

15                     to rely on this for 50 years. It doesn't matter  

16                     whether it was wrong because overruling

17                     something requires more than just the decision  

18                     be wrong. It has been there. States have

19                     relied on it. There's no reason to change it.  

20                     The end. Stare decisis.

21                     But you're telling me that Justice  

22                     Powell's opinion isn't entitled to precedential

23                     force, isn't entitled to stare decisis effect.

24                     So I don't know what to do with that argument anymore.

1                         MS. MURRILL: Justice Kagan, I agree  

2                         with everything that you said about the reasons

3                         why this Court should affirm Apodaca and that it

4                         should be given stare decisis effect.

5                         I -- I think that we are struggling  

6                         with the fact that Justice Powell's decision  

7                         doesn't seem to be the view of the Court and -- 

8                         and that it -- the text and the history also, I   

9                         -- I strongly and firmly believe, are on our

10                       side.

11                       JUSTICE ALITO: Well, you're not the  

12                       only state who has an interest here. And, in   

13                       fact, there's only one state going forward as of  

14                       this moment that has an interest in this, and  

15                       that's Oregon. And Oregon might change its rule

16                       or it might not change its rule.

17                       But Oregon filed a brief and Oregon

18                       doesn't make the arguments you're making.

19                       Oregon says it should be made clear what this  

20                       brief does not do. It does not address the  

21                       merits of whether Apodaca was correctly decided.

22                       MS. MURRILL: I -- and I think that   

23                       Oregon finds itself in a position where the  

24                       democratic process has stalled in anticipation of this decision. So they've -- they've written  

1   a brief that expressly, I think, emphasizes all

2   of our reliance interests. Puerto Rico has

3   similar reliance interests. There's a long line  

4   of cases that dealt with territorials and the

          5 

          6 

          7 

          8 

          9   

         10 

         11 

         12 

right -- and the Constitution's application to  territories. They have similar interests too.

So we -- we do think that the reliance  

interests are very, very important.

JUSTICE ALITO: I mean, it's true --

MS. MURRILL: We believe that the

judgment was correct.

JUSTICE ALITO: It is certainly true

13   that we, in recent years, have rejected the

14   two-track idea about incorporation, but the

15   opposite isn't a crazy argument. As recently as  

16   McDonald, there were some voices on this Court  

17   that it was -- were essentially making that  

18   argument with respect to the Second Amendment.

19   And earlier, there were -- it's a very   

20   respectable argument. It hasn't won the light  

21   -- it -- it hasn't won the day completely, but

22   that's what Apodaca rests on.

23   MS. MURRILL: Well, Justice Alito, if  

24   you're telling me that there is a little bit of daylight, then I'll take it. I mean, I -- I

think that, you know, we -- but I also believe  

2                       the history -- that --  that the history shows

3                       that unanimity was rejected and that that is the

4                       correct view.

5                       CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is --

6                       MS. MURRILL: So I -- I --     we are not

7                       entirely repudiating the -- the Apodaca  

8                       judgment. And we do have 50 years of reliance,   

9                       which is why I emphasize that we have 32,000  

10                     people who are incarcerated right now at hard  

11                     labor for serious crimes, and every one of them

         12 

         13 

         14 

         15 

         16 

         17 

         18 

         19 

would be subject -- would --  would be able to file an appeal.

JUSTICE BREYER: Do you think 32,000

people were non-unanimous?

MS. MURRILL: No, no, no, Justice Breyer.

JUSTICE BREYER: Or how -- I mean, I  

can't -- I don't understand why it would apply  

20                       to people who were unanimously convicted, maybe,  

21                       but -- but I think the stronger case would be   

22                       those people convicted by juries that were not

23                       unanimous. And how many of those are there?

24                       MS. MURRILL: We don't know, because they --

JUSTICE BREYER: I mean --

MS. MURRILL: -- there wasn't -- 

3                       JUSTICE BREYER: -- have you any idea?

4                       Is there -- with all the work gone into this,  

5                       has anybody got any rough idea of what

6                       percentage of those people who are convicted are

          7 

          8 

          9   

         10 

         11 

         12 

         13 

convicted by non-unanimous juries?

MS. MURRILL: There's just no reliable

data.

JUSTICE BREYER: Well, if there's -- MS. MURRILL: But I can --

JUSTICE BREYER: -- no reliable data,

we'd think -- can I fairly think if there had  

14                       been some data, even if you just take a sample,  

15                       you would be telling us? And, therefore, the  

16                       fact that you're telling us that there are a lot

17                       of people in jail, which I did know --

18                       MS. MURRILL: Well --

19                       (Laughter.)

20                       JUSTICE BREYER:  -- that that suggests  

21                       something.

22                       MS. MURRILL: Well --

23                       JUSTICE BREYER: Now, then you say  

24                       there's you, there's Oregon, that they're waiting. All right. But Puerto Rico is a tough   

case, actually. There's a Hispanic tradition, and I don't know, you might have to bring up the

3                       Insular Cases. You might -- you might have to   

4                       revise them. You might have -- get into the  

5                       status question. Puerto Rico is worrying me.

6                       So is there -- is there something you   

7                       want to say about that since you raised it?

8                       MS. MURRILL: Well, we have the same

9                       tradition, but I -- but the -- the --   

10                     JUSTICE BREYER: You have the same  

11                     tradition, but you don't have as a matter of  

12                     fact the whole system of trials that grows out

         13 

         14 

         15 

         16 

         17 

         18 

of the civil tradition. Or is it --

MS. MURRILL: Well, that's why I think

all 32,000 --

JUSTICE BREYER: Well, all right, skip

that. That wasn't --

MS. MURRILL: -- are at risk because

19                       we do have a system built around --

20                       JUSTICE BREYER: I got past the

21                       32,000. I now want to know, since you've looked   

22                       into Puerto Rico, is there a particular problem

23                       there if we overturn Apodaca?

24                       MS. MURRILL: I believe --

JUSTICE BREYER: If we --

MS. MURRILL: -- there is.

JUSTICE BREYER: I know you believe

3                       there is. I just want to know what there is,  

4                       rather than my making it up.

5                       MS. MURRILL: Because the territorial

6                       decisions were based on the authority of

7                       Congress to write laws that were different for

8                       territories notwithstanding the fact that they

9                       still came under the protection of the

10                     Constitution, I think that there's a problem.

11                     So it's the same -- I mean, the issue   

12                     here is, does the -- the Sixth Amendment require   

13                     unanimity? And unless you're going to continue  

14                     a special carveout for the territories, then

15                     they have the same question.

16                     CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is the -- the   

17                     32,000 -- is the reason you don't know because  

18                     the jury is not typically polled or -- or what?  

19                     MS. MURRILL: Because it is not always  

20                     polled and because the defense -- that is a   

21                     responsibility of the defense to do that.  And  

22                     even in some cases where it may have been, it  

23                     may not have been recorded or kept. And so the   

24                     data -- the --  the case files are -- seem to be  very inconsistent on this.

We do know that we are already receiving a flood of these cases, as is this

3                         Court. We know that -- you know, we filed 25   

4                         briefs in the Louisiana Supreme Court last  

5                         Friday. So we have a -- this case -- this is    

6                         certainly unsettling the cases, but because a  

7                         number of those people pleaded guilty based on  

8                         their expectation of potential -- of facing a   

9                         10-2 verdict, the criminal defense attorneys

10                       filed an amicus brief arguing that point.

11                       We also have people who would

12                       receive -- everyone that went to trial received   

13                       this jury instruction. So we're not saying they

14                       all win. We are saying --